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BOOK NOTICES.

Welt und Weltzeiten, in two volumes, by Dr. Hugo Delff. Published by Brockhaus & Co., Leipzig, Germany.

In a previous number of this Journal we had occasion, in noticing two of Dr. Delff's works on Dante, to refer also to his several philosophical works, and indicate their general stand-point as most closely allied to the teachings of F. Baader. In the present two volumes, published by the large establishment of Brockhaus, in a superior style of type and paper, Dr. Delff has entered much more thoroughly than in any of his previous works upon the development of his views, and also established their historical continuity with greater precision. In this historical continuity the two most prominent figures are Plato and Jacob Boehme, with F. Baader as the nearest modern connecting link. This remark alone might be sufficient to indicate that the book before us lives and moves in a spirit of uncompromising protest against the superficial materialistic teachings and writings which in Germany, as well as in England and here with us, seem to sweep from the field of pure scientific literature all that is thorough and worthy of study. Discoveries and hypotheses are heralded as new, that to the student of science are as familiar as household words. To note this in merely one direction, it may be safely said that there is scarcely a theory, or, as it is absurdly called, "newly discovered law of nature," put forward by the men of natural science of the present day, which was not set forth with greater precision in the scientific works of Descartes, some three hundred years ago, whose theory of the sun-spots, to mention only one, is to this day the completest that we have, and one to which our new men of Science are gradually drifting back again, just as they are drifting back to his purely mechanical theory of the universe.

Though Dr. Delff also touches off these characteristics of superciliousness and ignorance in the modern works of science, his opposition takes chiefly the stand-point of an earnest warfare against the utter demoralization and degeneration of man, which he conceives to be the inevitable result of their influence. Against this degenerating view and philosophy, Dr. Delff seeks refuge in the revival of that higher view of man, nature, the relations of man, &c., the sublimest exponents whereof, in his opinion, have been Plato, amongst the ancients, and Jacob Boehme, amongst the moderns. His stand-point in this matter is best characterized in his own words, thus:

"It is incomprehensible how those people who boast so much about science, and who by imposing attitudes have acquired an almost contradiction-proof authority in scientific matters, have after all not the remotest understanding as to the real nerve and essence of scientific method . . . If they possessed less pretension, and could bring themselves to first attending the school of Plato and Aristotle, with whom the conception of science had its origin, that is, to study philosophy, where that conception has necessarily its most natural and valid form, whereas in its course from thence it of necessity receives additions that obscure and distort it,—they would be able to maintain their dignity with more justice.

"That knowledge which in this manner raises opposition to philosophy is in itself absolutely nought, and a glossed ignorance from the very fact that it deals only with the finite, the external and particular, and that it ex-

presses even in its generalizations nothing but a particular, external content. For there is no such thing as a knowledge of the finite, as a particular, and an external, since it is not the substance but the form which constitutes knowledge. In other words, it is not the immediately given content of experience which is the essential of knowledge, but the force of that content—a force which reveals itself and organizes its content, thereby qualifying it into a knowledge, only in thought . . .

"Thus it is only in and through philosophy that knowledge, science, and scientific method, are brought about; and it is evident that every self-named science which claims independence and absoluteness outside of (or perhaps even opposes) philosophy, is by that very fact condemned and pronounced necessarily unscientific. . . . Philosophy is therefore, if not all science, at least the heart in the organism of science; its empress, whom all the other sciences have to submit to as her vassals."

A point so often repeated, and yet so constantly lost sight of! Where do the men of so-called science—meaning the men of all sciences except philosophy—get their categories and classifications from if not from philosophy? Did any mathematician ever *see* a point, a straight line, a perfect curve, &c.? Did any naturalist ever see, hear, feel, taste, or smell, such things as cause, substance, force, pure light, &c.? If in using these words, these words mean to them some sensuous, perceptible, outside things of their own world, why does no one point it out?

"It is not the finite," continues Dr. Delff in another place, "which constitutes man as man, but the infinite, which fills up the finite and develops therein the powers of the infinite. Hence those other arguers are quite right in arguing their origin for themselves back to the monkeys, or to the creeping larvæ of a horrible primitive mud-chaos."

And again:

"Philosophy is such an immense achievement of the mind, because it involves emancipation from the whole series of tradition, wherein man is involved, and from the oppression of natural reality, the coarse fact. It is the very highest freedom which achieves itself in philosophy. For that emancipation is not an arbitrary, groundless negation, but a liberation, which by freeing itself from its oppression does not cut loose from it, but becomes its master. Its content is not a formal, but the true, substantial freedom Philosophy is, in truth, a divine deed. For it is not the sundering itself of a finite subjectivity from an equally finite objectivity, *but it is rather the divine in man, the unity which the mind has with the infinite; philosophy is that which excludes all mere finity and externality, and which tries to compel the actual to speak spiritually, ideally, rationally.*"

In another part of his book, Dr. Delff thus completes the description of that general stand-point which his book elaborates in the various detailed departments of Logic, Metaphysic, Natural Science, &c.:

"There is this distinction between the absolute idea, with the absolute system resulting from it, and the particular systems: the former is the constitutive principle of rational consciousness and reason, wherein these live by their very nature. Their close union with that idea is an intimacy and unity of contemplation, but it is not a perceivable unity, since sensuousness throws a shadow on the clearness of contemplation. We stand, as Plotinus says, in the face of a completed arithmetical problem, and in gathering together its particular elements we must first toilsomely make the calculation. But the key to it is the absolute or its contemplation, and the original forms of development which result from it and continue themselves in us. At

first these are involved only in the exercises of pondering and thinking. But if reason wishes to arrive at these fundamental ideas and principles themselves, it can be done only by turning aside from all the particular and singular, for only thus does reason return to the roots of its inner activity. Thus does reason gain the real representation of the absolute, or of the absolute idea in thought. When Eschenmayer, Jacobi, and others of the same tendency, objected against Schelling, that that which we cognized of the absolute was after all not the absolute itself but only a shadow thereof, they should have added 'in thought.' *For in thought we have not the absolute itself; but we are one with the absolute in consciousness.*"

This latter sentence is probably as concise a statement of Dr. Delff's whole philosophy as could be made. It contains all his views in a nut-shell. He proceeds:

"And when they said that the absolute could only be felt, they forgot that to feel is not the natural and peculiar determinedness of consciousness, but that its characteristic is cognition as an immediate cognizing of the Being itself, hence a contemplation. . . . Feeling is the passive being filled with a foreign Other; it is an oppression of consciousness and of the individual unity actualized in it. But it is not the manner of the Absolute to suppress that which grew out of it as it has grown to be; but rather to gather it up and retain it in itself, and, thus retaining it in its peculiarity, make it a member of itself, a one within it, and a distinct unity within it of its own unity. But this is cognizing unity; for whereas feeling cancels distinction, cognition is conditioned by distinguishing within a unity. . . .

Deum esse non creditur, sed scitur. No man can get rid of this knowledge, though he may drown it awhile, so long as he can muffle his consciousness in external sensuality. If we could strip off sensuousness, we should be forced inevitably and even against our will to confess and know that God is. Yet this knowledge makes neither wise nor happy. That God makes me and includes my individual unity in his own absolute unity, I can neither hinder nor assist in accomplishing. But that I shall really be and remain in unity with God, this only my will can achieve; I must comprehend myself in God as I am comprehended in him, must fill myself with God as I am filled with him."

These latter words will recall to the mind of our readers some of the profound sayings of Angelus Silesius, published in a previous number of the Journal; and with them we must conclude our introduction to the American public of an author whose efforts in behalf of a higher cause and of genuine science are as untiring and zealous as they are inspired by rare knowledge and a happy gift of presentation.

A. E. K.

Die Neue Zeit. Freie Hefte fuer Höherbildung der Wissenschaft und des Lebens, den Gebildeten aller Stände gewidmet. Im Geiste des Philosophencongresses unter Mitwirkung von Gessinnungs-genossen, herausgegeben von Dr. Hermann Freiherrn von Leonhardi, ord. öffentl. Professor an der Prager Universität. Vol. II.

It will be remembered by the readers of the *Journal of Speculative Philosophy* that in September, 1868, the first of a series of Philosophical Congresses was called together at Prague, a call for the third of which series is published in the volume of the periodical now before us. Dr. H. Freiherr von Leonhardi, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Prague, was the main originator of and is still the chief mover in the continued meetings of these Congresses of Philosophers, one of the results of which, so far, has been the establishment of *Die Neue Zeit*, a periodical of a quarterly nature, devoted not only to Philosophy as a science, but also in a general

way to a "higher culture of science and of life," dedicated "to the cultured classes of all professions and ranks," and edited by Professor von Leonhardi. Leonhardi is, if we mistake not, a brother-in-law of the renowned Philosopher Krause,* of whose doctrines he is a very zealous adherent. Indeed this serves somewhat to explain the wide range of subjects to which he opens his periodical, and which, under his direction, were put before the Philosophers' Congresses; for Krause's philosophy, or rather system of doctrines, is essentially of what is usually called a practical character, largely devoted to Law, Politics, Ethics, Education, Freemasonry as a means of reaching higher general culture, &c. Thus we find the *Neue Zeit* paying special attention to the questions that agitate the Catholic world since the promulgation of the Infallibility, as also to the new legal results which the Imperialization of Germany has grafted upon the formerly independent minor German States by forcing the Prussian Code upon them—and thus, for instance, reëstablishing the death penalty where this atrociously irrational and barbarous practice had previously been done away with by enlightened communities;—and to the school system of Germany, the Fröbel Kindergarten system, &c. &c. Speaking about the Prussian Conscription Law, the *Neue Zeit* pertinently asks: "What is to become of Europe if the *compulsory murder-service*, the so-called general military duty, becomes everywhere an inexorable state law, obligatory even for those whose consciences revolt at it; when, in the thoughtless execution of a so-called Unification, the voice of conscience is everywhere silenced by the belief in the infallible assurance of the supreme War-chief, . . . that he alone is and that not the people are responsible for his ordered violation of divine moral law."

Besides articles on these more general subjects, the volume before us contains a lecture on Immortality by Theo. Schliephake, an article on Schelling by Moritz Schwach, and one by Dr. Franz Hoffmann, well-known to our readers, on Baader's Philosophy. In connection with the first article it may be mentioned, what seems to have been overlooked in the countless essays on Immortality since Plato, that the question is *not* whether reason, or spirit in general, is immortal—for it is as absurd to question its permanency as the permanency of matter, force, time and space; but that the question is, whether this veritable Tom, Dick, or Harry, of earthly, planetary experience, with his individual personality—that is to say, his memory, culture, and achievements—will continue to live, in some other body or shape, throughout an infinite time, in some part or another of infinite space. Or, to put it into stricter form: when universal reason comes to self-consciousness in this or that earthly individual—for instance, in me—does that self-consciousness, with all its acquired content of earthly culture, remain during all infinite time; or does it, with the death of my earthly personality, my body, discard, like a force, its peculiar character as this peculiar individual self-consciousness, and become again mere general reason, to reappear perhaps to-morrow in some other new-born individual with utter oblivion of previ-

* A son of this celebrated Professor died lately at Jefferson City, Mo., where he had resided for a long time and successfully practised his profession of medicine.

ous life and attainments? This is really the only matter in dispute, and all *general arguments* do not, therefore, touch the question at all. It is an empirical question and can be answered only empirically; either by the reappearance of a dead person, which is the chief proof of the Christian religion, or by the individual empirical self-consciousness of an immortal will. A man who feels a lingering doubt that the moral world could get along just as well without as with him, may be pardoned if he ponders the question, though it scarcely justifies him in inflicting a useless dissertation upon the matter on the reading public; a man who knows himself a necessary member of that world, will neither doubt nor "dissent."

Prof. Schliephake in his eloquent lecture unhappily wastes considerable time in discussing the first mentioned question, which is *not* under discussion, namely, that universal spirit, like universal everything else, can have no category of mortality predicated of it; but we are glad to say that in the latter half of his essay he does formulate the question in its real shape. Of course, the theological-historical argument of the resurrection of Christ he, as a philosopher, does not touch; and the only remaining proof of immortality is to him therefore, as just stated, the empirical self-consciousness of an immortal will, or, in Prof. Schliephake's own words, "a permanent continuance"—i.e. of the individual Tom or Dick—"is the only correspondent measure for the temporal development and full unfolding of the rational being."

It is rather odd that Prof. Schliephake does not see and state that this is precisely the proof of immortality which Kant, who was the first to put a stop to the absurd metaphysical ravings about proofs of immortality, announced in his Critique of Practical Reason as the only possible proof, and which, in his words, reads: "a *holy* will can be realized only in the thinking of an infinite progress, which is possibly only under the presupposition of an infinitely continuing existence and personality of the same rational being."

Far be it from us to make this remark in order to give Kant credit for the originality of the discovery. Such claims of credit are low and childish, and Kant would be the last to make pretensions to them. But we should like to know, of what earthly use is it for philosophy and philosophers to go over this question again after it has been once for all settled by Kant? That it has been so settled, Prof. Schliephake, by agreeing with Kant as to the only proof, admits. Why, then, waste further breath, further muscular power, and further talents in style of diction—which in this essay, or rather lecture, of Prof. Schliephake's shows a degree of clearness, and at the same time rhythmical elegance of language, rarely attained by German writers on philosophical matters—upon an exhausted subject?

Dr. Hoffmann, in his article on Baader, reopens his controversy with Karl Rosenkranz, which was first broached in the *Journal of Speculative Philosophy*, regarding the latter's estimate of Baader's doctrines. Curiously enough, the immortality question plays also in this article the most important part, Dr. Hoffmann repeating his charge that Rosenkranz and Hegel deny immortality. Hoffmann makes his chief point against Hegel's system in this way:—How can you call that a system which leads its followers and

professed students to say of it three things: the one party, MICHELET *et al.*, holding that Hegel denied Personality of God and Immortality; the second party, ERDMANN *et al.*, holding that Hegel asserted Personality of God and Immortality; and the third party, ROSENKRANZ *et al.*, holding that Hegel asserted Personality of God, but denied Immortality?

There is getting to be amongst our philosophical friends across the water an amount of personal matter, egotism, and pretension to first discovery, in these controversies of theirs, which seems to us not only superfluous but harmful. What on earth does it matter who worked hardest, and who discovered first? In matters of pure science, it is the science alone which is of moment; and we might well suggest to these good gentlemen that the works of Leibnitz and Kant are not only worthy of study as embodying all the results of the science of Philosophy on those matters of God, Freedom, and Immortality, but also for that unegotistic calm and repose which characterizes the true lover of science.

At some future time we propose to sketch, for the benefit of the readers of this Journal, Professor Leonhardi's own views and applications of Krause's system; views that, at least in their educational and generally humanitarian aspect, are of general and constantly growing interest amidst our own stormy agitations of the various reform questions.

A. E. KROEGER.

[Our contributor, Mr. Kroeger, expresses his own views very freely in the foregoing notice of Dr. Leonhardi's periodical, and we cannot but dissent emphatically from many of his positions. The question of capital punishment is one of historical and social development that is not by any means clearly settled by our most enlightened political philosophers. Again, Professor Schliephake, we must acknowledge, discusses a philosophical question of the highest importance, and Mr. Kroeger seems utterly to mistake the significance of the category of Universality when applied to human consciousness. Mind is indeed a generic entity—a Universal—but only as individual Ego whose atomic particularity is infinite. But there is no "mere general reason" that could "discard its peculiar character as this peculiar individual self" and "reappear to-morrow in some other new-born individual"; but the essence of reason is, as Fichte declared it, "subject-objectivity," or, in other words, its essence is to be subject which is its own object—self-consciousness. Its individuality consists in this, and its possibility of knowing or thinking at all depends upon this fundamental act of *self-cognition*; hence a Reason that did not cognize itself as individual, as person, would not and could not know or think at all, and the name REASON would be a misnomer. On the contrary, a philosophic proof of immortality is one of the fittest subjects of philosophic investigation, and such a proof is certainly a possible thing in many different forms. Indeed, that philosophy that has not penetrated the essence of personality far enough to find immortality has not completed its phenomenology or "voyage of discovery," and can in nowise be said to be a "system." The problem of Immortality is to be solved by investigating the determinations of the idea of Universality, or the Generic. If the procedure is strict, the thinker will find that the Universal can be predi-

cated only of that which is its own object—a self-determined, “self-moved,” self-defined, a “subject-object,” an Ego. The quotation from Kant at once reveals to us the occasion of the misunderstanding on Mr. Kroeger’s part. That “infinite progress” which Kant found necessary as the logical presupposition of the will in its ideal or normal condition, is precisely that “reflection into itself,” as Hegel calls it, which is the characteristic of the Generic, or of the “*actus purus*,” as the Aristotelians called the Universal. “Reflection into itself” is realized perfectly in consciousness where the object, the *other*, the non-Ego is the Ego, the subject itself. No infinite progress can be thought or imagined except as reflection into itself, i.e. except as the pure form of self-consciousness. Kant was a great thinker indeed, and in no utterance of his is that greatness more manifest. But had he been able to precipitate his thought in Aristotelian forms, had he been able to find the pure thought underlying the Idea of Infinite Progress as its logical condition, he would have found a *speculative* basis as well as a practical or “regulative” basis for the doctrine of Immortality. This was done by the logical acumen of Hegel, who found “substance to be subject” and infinite progress to be only the phenomenal view of self-determination; in short, he ascended from the subjective doctrine of “forms of the mind,” set up by Kant and elaborated into a system of absolute Psychology by Fichte, to the Greek thought of Entelechy and a Personal Theism. It is “*not* of so much matter who discovered first” indeed, but to discover at all is the greatest of matters.

The promised paper on Dr. Leonhardi’s views will be looked for with interest. EDITOR.]

Philosophische Monatshefte. Herausgegeben von J. Bergmann. V. Band. Sommersemester 1870. Berlin: Otto Loewenstein.

The fifth volume of this Journal of Philosophy contains the following articles:—No. 1: *Dr. Otto Liebmann*—On a Modern Application of Mathematics to Psychology. *Dr. E. v. Hartmann*—“Is Pessimistic Monism without Consolation?” *Dr. Adolph Bennecke*—A short Exposition and Critique on the Leibnizian Proof of the Existence of God; Literary Reviews and Book Notices on “Christopher Sigwart on Spinoza’s Tractate on God, Man, and Happiness,” and Bratuschek’s work on Instruction in French Grammar in the Realschule.—No. 2: *Theodor Jahr* on National Movements and the Unions of States; *Literary Reviews* on Ueberweg’s Criticism of Berkeley’s System: Article I. by *Collins Simon*, Art. II. by *R. Hoppe*, Art. III. by *Wilhelm Schuppe*—No. 3: *Conrad Hermann*, on the History of Æsthetics and the latest works on the same. *Literary Reviews* on the Outlines of a Theory of Consciousness by J. Bergmann, and Book Notices of Harms: Philosophical Introduction to the Encyclopedia of Physics; *A. Mayer*—Sensuous Illusions and Hallucinations; *C. Grapengiesser*—Kant’s Doctrine on Time and Space.—No. 4: *E. Bratuschek* on Kuno Fischer and Trendelenburg. *Melchior Muyr* on Infinite Time and Eternity. *Literary Reviews*: on the Life of Schleiermacher, by Wilhelm Dilthey; on Important Questions of the Time, by G. H. G. Jahr; on the Admission of Women to higher Schools and Universities.—No. 5: *E. v. Hartmann* on

the Necessary Reconstruction of the Hegelian System from its Fundamental Principle. *F. Ueberweg* on the Criticism of the Berkeleyan System. *Book Notices* on Windelband's Doctrine of Chance; on Prosper Despine's "Psychologie Naturelle"; on Max Schassler's "Popular Thoughts collected from the Writings of Hegel"; on Fortlage's Psychological Lectures.

The sixth volume of the *Philosophische Monatshefte* contains the following articles, published during the winter of 1870-71:—No. 1: *Adolph Lasson* on the Nature of [Legal] Right; *Julius Frauenstädt* on Minding's "Pope Sixtus the Fifth" and Hartmann's "Aphorisms on the Drama"; *J. Bergmann* on Thaulow's "Centennial Birth-day of Hegel"; Correspondence between Strauss and Renan.—No. 2: *Adolph Lasson* on the Nature of the State; *E. Mätzner* on Rosenkranz's "Hegel as the National Philosopher of Germany"; *J. Bergmann* on Köstlin's "Hegel exhibited in his Philosophical, Political, and National Relation to the German People."—No. 3: *E. v. Hartmann* on Dynamism and Atomism (Kant, Ulrici, Fechner); *Conrad Hermann* on the Scientific Definition of Æsthetics; *J. Gillies* on Hansemann's "Atoms and Atomic Movements"; *Bratuscheck* on "Index Aristotelicuis, ed. Hermannus Bonitz"; *J. Bergmann* on Leopold George's "Logic as Science of Knowledge"; on the Centennial Celebration of Beethoven's Birth-day; on the Course of Study for Women.—No. 4: *Leonhardt Freund*, "Remarks on the State and Society with especial reference to the Views of Stein and Gneist"; *J. Hülsmann* on "What is Actual is Reasonable, and What is Reasonable is Actual"; *J. Frauenstädt* on Friedrich Zelle's "Difference between the Kantian and Aristotelian Conceptions of Logic"; *Ernst Kuhn* on Theophilus' "Philosophy of Luther," and Richter's "Melancthon's Services in the Cause of Philosophical Instruction."—No. 5: *Julius Bahnsen*, "A Word against Overstrained Criticism"; *Melchior Mayr* "on the Propriety of a Closer Union of Poetry and Philosophy"; *Wilhelm Schuppe* "An Open Letter to Professor Ueberweg"; *C. Schaarschmidt* "on the Examination of the Sources of Spinoza's Theological-political Tractate by Dr. M. Joel, Rabbi of the Jewish Church at Breslau"; "on the Italian Society for the furtherance of Philosophy and Literary Studies."

The seventh volume of the *Philosophische Monatshefte* contains the following articles:—No. 1: *Conrad Hermann* on "the Law of Æsthetic Harmony and the Rule of the Golden Mean"; *J. Hülsmann* on E. M. Arndt; *K. Köstlin* on Planck's "Law and Ultimate Aim of the Modern Development of Art as compared with the Antique"; *J. Bergmann* on Hebler's "Philosophical Essays"; *J. Frauenstädt*, Reply to Bahnsen.—No. 2: *E. v. Hartmann*, "Natural Science and Philosophy"; *F. Hoffmann* on "the Hegelian Philosophy in St. Louis, U. S. A."; *E. Bratuscheck* on "Th. Funck-Brentano's *La Pensee exacte en Philosophie*"; *J. Bergmann* on C. Hebler's "Philosophical Essays."—No. 3: *E. v. Hartmann*, "Natural Science and Philosophy"; *J. Hülsmann*, "Remarks on L. v. Ranke and his last work, 'The German Powers'"; *Conrad Hermann* on the Philosophy of History; *Friedrich Harms* on Quäbicker's Critical-philosophical Investigations in Rational Psychology; on the Completion of the Statue of Hegel in Berlin; on Frauenstädt's "Reply."—No. 4: *Friedrich Harms*' Address in Commemoration of Hegel; *Max Eyfferth* on Hartmann's "Thing in Itself and

of its Nature"; Kantian Studies in the Theory of Knowledge and Metaphysics; *F. Hoffmann* on Maximilian Perty's Exposition of "Nature in the Light of Philosophical Intuition"; *F. Hoffmann* on Eberhard Zirngiebel's "Studies on the Institution of the Society of Jesuits with special regard to the Pedagogical Influence of this Order in Germany."—No. 5: *Ernst Bratuscheck*, "In what consists the 'Infinite Attributes of Substance' ('*infininitis attributis*') as taught by Spinoza?" *Julius Bahnsen*, "Indications of the Species of Being"; *Book Notices* on some recent writings in the province of Ecclesiastical and Religious Discussions in the periodical called "Deutschland," edited by *W. Hoffmann*.—No. 6: *J. Hülsmann*, "Some Thoughts on the Means and Nature of Exposition in the Art of Painting"; *Dr. Jung* on Gustav Gerber's "Language as Æsthetic Art"; *Max Eyyferth* on *F. Michelis*' "Kant before and after the year 1870"—"Eine Kritik der gläubigen Vernunft"; *Karl Rosenkranz*, "Baader's Theism and my alleged Semi-Pantheism."—No. 7: *Adolph Lasson*, "Memoir of Friedrich Ueberweg"; *K. Rosenkranz* on "Baader's Theism and my alleged Semi-Pantheism"; *J. Hülsmann* on some recent writings in the province of Ecclesiastical and Religious Discussion.—No. 8: *Otto Liebmann* on the Phenomenality of Space; *Adolf Gaspary* on Morality and Darwinism; *C. Schaurschmidt* on Dr. Joel's Investigation of the Origin of Spinoza's Views in the Tractate on "God, Man, and Happiness"; *Ernst Kuhn* on Schuppe's "The Thinking Activity of Man" and "The Aristotelian Categories."—No. 9: *R. Hoppe* on Ueberweg's Criticism of Berkeley's System; *O. Marburg*, "Critical Aphorisms on Dr. Franck's System of Christian Evidence: its Problem and the General Nature of Evidence"; *J. Hülsmann* on the Relation of Ecstatic Vision to the Theistic View of the World; on Barzellotti's "La Morale nella Filosofia positiva"; *J. Bergmann* on Hollenberg's "Contributions to Christian Knowledge."—No. 10: *E. Bratuscheck* on Hegel's Comprehension of Plato; *O. Liebmann* on Subjective, Objective and Absolute Time.

With the seventh volume closed Dr. Bergmann's Editorship, as we have already announced (*Jour. Spec. Phil.*, vol. vi. p. 183). The contents of the eighth volume together with the Prospectus of Dr. Bratuscheck, the present Editor, we reserve for a future time.

Zur Lösung dreier Zeitfragen: Christenthum, "Confessionsloser" Religionsunterricht, Völkerfriede. Für Erzieher, Religionslehrer, Bildungsvereine, Freimaurer und alle höher Strebenden Menschenfreunde. Prag: 1871. Verlag von F. Tempsky.

In this treatise Christianity is considered, apart from its dogmatic claims, as a pure phenomenon of Culture, in the light of Krause's Philosophy of History.

Professor H. Leonhardi is the author of the Essay. He appends a work of Karl Christian Friedrich Krause, entitled "The Commandments of Humanity" (*Die Gebote der Menschlichkeit*), in which the doctrines of morality are presented in the form of a catechism.

Betrachtungen über die Einrichtung höherer Bürgerschulen ohne Latein, I.—VII. Von Moritz Müller, senior. Pforzheim.

Der Kreissanschluss in Baden über die höherer Bürgerschulen. Von Moritz Müller, senior. Pforzheim.